## Pages 1 - 50

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Judge Presiding

FINJAN, LLC, )
Plaintiff, )

VS. NO. 3:14-cv-04908-RS

PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC.,

Defendant.

San Francisco, California Thursday, November 14, 2024

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

## **APPEARANCES:**

For Plaintiff:

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ATTORNEYS AT LAW

(APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED BY: Kelly Shainline, CSR No. 13476, RPR, CRR Official Reporter

1 **APPEARANCES**: (CONTINUED) 2 For Defendant: MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 3 425 Market Street San Francisco, California 94105 4 BY: TIMOTHY SAULSBURY MATTHEW I. KREEGER JOHN DOUGLASS 5 ATTORNEYS AT LAW 6 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 7 250 W 55th Street New York, New York 10019 8 BY: KYLE W.K. MOONEY ATTORNEY AT LAW 9 Also Present: Andrea Gothing, Finjan In-House Counsel Ann Taylor, Finjan IP Specialist 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

## 1 Thursday - November 14, 2024 2:05 p.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 THE CLERK: Calling Case 14-cv-4908, Finjan vs. 4 5 Palo Alto Networks. Counsel, please come forward and state your appearances. 6 MR. SAULSBURY: Good afternoon. On behalf of 7 Palo Alto Networks you have Tim Saulsbury from the Morrison 8 Foerster firm. I'm joined by my colleagues Kyle Mooney, John 9 Douglass, and Matt Kreeger. 10 11 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. DENNING: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Roger 12 13 Denning of Fish & Richardson on behalf of the plaintiff Finjan. MS. BROOKS: And also Juanita Brooks of Fish & 14 15 Richardson on behalf of Finjan. MR. DENNING: We have our colleague Tyler Train from 16 Fish & Richardson here as well; as well as Andrea Gothing, 17 in-house counsel for Finjan; and Ann Taylor, in-house IP 18 19 specialist for Finjan. 20 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 21 MR. DENNING: Good afternoon. THE COURT: So we are here on motions for summary 22 23 judgment and at this juncture in this long-lived case, which

has been touched by several of my colleagues, I believe, we

have, I think, three patents remaining -- the '408, the '633,

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and the '731 -- and there are various arguments with respect to each of these different patents.

So why don't I go ahead. I was going to start with the moving party, as I usually do, so -- but I would actually encourage counsel for Finjan to step up because we can do this patent by patent as opposed to going through all three and then you go going through all three.

So whoever wants to speak can come on up, but I'll look first to the moving party.

MR. SAULSBURY: Thank you, Your Honor.

And just a brief housekeeping item. I think we're going to be able to address the issues without asking to close the courtroom or anything of that nature, notwithstanding that they get into technical issues.

I wasn't sure if there was anybody still on the Zoom link.

THE COURT: Well, this is where we probably have some -- this is an open courtroom. I'm not sealing the courtroom.

MR. SAULSBURY: Surely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I also don't have a problem with somebody on Zoom. And I think I've, in this case, given you my spiel about oversealing, but I feel particularly strongly that the courtroom does not get sealed. So there we are. So if somebody is listening, they can listen as far as I'm concerned.

MR. SAULSBURY: Okay.

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THE COURT:
                          All right?
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              MR. SAULSBURY: Thank you, Your Honor.
              THE COURT:
                          Okay. So whoever wants to discuss this,
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 4
     come on up. I assume there's somebody on that side.
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              MR. MOONEY: Kyle Mooney, Your Honor.
                          Okay.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. MOONEY: I've got some slides. If I could hand
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     those up.
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              THE COURT: Of course, because this is a patent case
     and no motion has ever been argued without PowerPoints in a
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     patent case.
              MR. MOONEY: I'll try to limit it, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Thank you.
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          Okay. Off you go.
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              MR. MOONEY: Again, Kyle Mooney, Morrison & Foerster,
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     representing Palo Alto Networks, Your Honor.
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          And we want to begin with the '408 patent in our motion
     for summary judgment of noninfringement of that patent.
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          Appreciate your patience, Your Honor.
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          The '408 patent -- we're going to have to go with the --
              THE COURT: Listen, I've got it in --
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              MR. MOONEY: Hard copy.
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              THE COURT: You've given it to me in paper form.
     Let's just --
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              MR. MOONEY: Let's just do the paper, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: -- barrel ahead.

MR. MOONEY: If you could turn to Slide 3, Your Honor.

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. MOONEY: And the '408 patent, as Your Honor heard a few months ago, is directed to an allegedly more efficient way to scan for malicious program code.

Finjan's original claims for this patent were directed to analyzing different programming languages using different rules, different parser and analyzer rules. The PTO rejected those claims as obvious based on prior art, and so Finjan amended the claims to the current claims that we're dealing with today; and those claims require that a computer first determine what programming language code is written in and then based on that determination, instantiate or start a scanner for that particular programming language.

And so, for example, in Figure 7 of the patent, there are three different scanners for three different programming languages -- HTML, JavaScript, and URI -- and then each of those scanners include the rules and the analyzers for that particular language.

And on the next slide, Slide 4, we have Claim 1. And these requirements are built into the claims. Claim 1 and Claim 22 are the independent claims, and these claims require that the computer first determine -- this is the yellow highlight -- any specific one of a plurality of programming

languages in which the incoming stream is written, and then instantiate or start a scanner for that specific programming language in response to said, that is after said, determining.

Finjan cannot prove that the accused products, NGFW or WildFire, meet these limitations, and the reason for that is that both of them allegedly include a single scanner that handles multiple different programming languages.

And so beginning with NGFW, this is on Slide 5, I asked Dr. Min, Finjan's technical expert, at his deposition what the alleged scanner in NGFW was. And I handed Dr. Min what is Exhibit 38 shown on the left of this slide without the red and the blue markings, and I asked Dr. Min to identify the alleged NGFW scanner that he relied on. And Dr. Min did that with the red pen and he included the entirety of the blue box, which is titled "CTD Engine" at the top and he also wrote "App ID" and circled that.

And Dr. Min's also got some red handwriting at the top.

Again, all of the writing on this exhibit is that of Dr. Min,

Finjan's expert. And his testimony on this slide is very

clear. This was the alleged scanner that he relied on for

NGFW, that is the CTD engine and App ID, and he did not rely on

any other scanner for that product.

And so on the next slide, this is Slide 6, Dr. Min acknowledged that this NGFW scanner that he relied on, the only one he relied on, could handle multiple different programming

languages. Accordingly, NGFW does not instantiate and Finjan cannot show it instantiates a scanner for a specific programming language.

Next slide, Slide 7.

And because it has a single scanner that handles multiple different programming languages, NGFW also does not need to and does not determine a programming language before it instantiates or starts a scanner for that language. That's clear based on the last testimony and it's doubly clear based on the testimony on this Slide 7.

And here on Slide 7 on Exhibit 38 I asked Dr. Min to identify using a blue marker the parts of NGFW determining programming languages. And as Your Honor can see, all of those parts that determine programming language are part of the scanner itself. Dr. Min circled two modules inside the CTD engine, those are his two blue circles; and he also circled App ID. All of these are part and parcel of the scanner itself. Accordingly, NGFW doesn't determine any programming language before it starts or instantiates the scanner.

Now, Finjan had a couple of responses here. First, they pointed to Dr. Min's expert report suggesting, I guess, that he had different opinions in that report; but if you look at that report beginning on Slide 8, Dr. Min's opinions there are consistent.

Dr. Min -- and I want to be clear about this -- Dr. Min

does not have any opinion that NGFW first determines a programming language and then instantiates a scanner for that specific programming language.

To the contrary, all the programming language, specific rules, or analyzers that Dr. Min identifies are part of or inside the alleged NGFW scanner that you saw him identify on Exhibit 38, all of them. And so, for example, paragraph 353 on Slide 8, which is one of the paragraphs that Finjan called out in its brief, here Dr. Min opines that there is a scanner, a single scanner, that comprises parser rules and analyzer rules for different languages. Well, that was the prior art and that's not what the claims require in this case.

On Slide 9 there are other examples of Dr. Min identifying a single scanner that has different rules for different languages. Even if that were true, that is not what the claims require and, again, that's exactly what the prior art had in it before Finjan amended the claims around it.

Slide 10. Finjan understands, I think, that Dr. Min's admissions effectively foreclose their infringement theory, and so Finjan devotes a good amount of its opposition to asking this Court to rewrite the claims in this case.

And so Finjan now is arguing for the first time that the claims of the '408 patent actually cover a situation where you have a single scanner that handles multiple different programming languages and that determines and adapts to

programming languages after it is started, after it is instantiated.

The Court shouldn't rewrite the claims for Finjan. First slide at Slide 11, as an initial matter, that's not what the claims say. The claims on their face, Claim 1, clearly requires that the computer determine a programming language and then, and only then, in response to that determination start a scanner for that specific language.

The order of operations is 100 percent clear in Claim 1 and Claim 22; and, moreover, some of the dependent claims refer to specific individual programming languages rather than encompassing a situation where there are multiple languages.

In Slide 12, Finjan's current position was contradicted by its expert. More than a year before, it argued for its interpretation to Your Honor in its opposition brief.

I asked Dr. Min about 18 months ago at his deposition [as read]:

"Does a computer that instantiates a scanner before it has determined any programming language of the incoming stream meet Claim 1 or Claim 22 of the '408 patent?"

And Dr. Min responded [as read]:

"And I -- I just told you it has to be in response to determining, so it would not meet the scope."

So Dr. Min a year and a half ago contradicted the interpretation that Finjan is now stepping forward with. And

Dr. Min certainly doesn't have any opinions the claims should be interpreted otherwise or that there be infringement under the interpretation he clearly was not taking.

And, lastly, on Slide 13, Finjan's position is not only contradicted by its technical expert in this case, it's also contradicted by Finjan's own arguments in another case.

Finjan took the opposite position just a few years ago in the Rapid7 case before Judge Noreika in Delaware. In that case, Rapid7, the defendant argued something along the lines of what Finjan is arguing here, and that is that Claims 1 and 22 of the '408 were directed to a single scanner that handled multiple different programming languages and that could adapt to those languages.

Rapid7 cited many of the same specification disclosures that Finjan relies on here; but in that case a couple of years ago, Finjan said, "No." Finjan said that that is not right, that is not how the claims should be interpreted and it argued against that interpretation. Instead, Finjan argued that the claims require that the instantiated scanner be for the specific programming language, and Judge Noreika accepted that information.

And so Finjan is likely judicially estopped, as we argue in our papers. Even if they are not, it's clear on the record that the position Finjan takes today is 180 degrees from the position they took in another case a year and a half ago.

And so in sum, NGFW can't meet and Finjan cannot show it meets those two limitations.

The next product, Your Honor, is WildFire, Slide 14.

Finjan can't show that WildFire meets these limitations either. Again, at his deposition I asked Dr. Min to identify the WildFire scanner that he is relying on to prove infringement, and Dr. Min circled in red on Exhibit 43 -- again, all the markings on this exhibit are Dr. Min's using markers at his deposition -- Dr. Min circled the static analyzer, that's top left, and the dynamic analyzer, that's in the middle of the page. And Dr. Min confirmed that the static analyzer together with the dynamic analyzer is the scanner he relied on. Very clear, Your Honor.

I asked him [as read]:

"So you've identified in Exhibit 43 the only scanner that you rely on in forming opinions about WildFire?"

And he told me then [as read]:

"Yes. What I identified in Exhibit 43 is the scanner that I identified."

The same problems exist with respect to this scanner,
Your Honor. And so on Slide 15 I asked Dr. Min the same
question about WildFire, the WildFire scanner, that I asked
about NGFW. I asked whether this WildFire scanner he relied on
can handle multiple different languages, and he said, "Yes."

And so, again, the WildFire scanner, much like the prior

art, can handle multiple different languages. Finjan cannot prove that it is instantiating a scanner for a specific programming language.

And, again, because of that, on Slide 16, Finjan can't prove that it determines a programming language before it instantiates a scanner for that language. They can't prove that because it doesn't do that because it doesn't have to because it handles multiple different languages.

And, again, just for clarity, on Slide 16 I asked Dr. Min to circle the parts of WildFire that determine programming language; and, once again, all of those parts that he identified in blue are inside of the scanner itself showing that the scanner handles multiple languages, not a single programming language.

Finjan had a couple of responses on the WildFire point.

Also, they pointed again to Dr. Min's expert report. It was effectively the same problem, Your Honor. Dr. Min does not have any opinion that WildFire first determines a programming language and then instantiates a scanner for that specific programming language.

Again, the programming language specific rules, the analyzers, the other components that Finjan now points to in Dr. Min's report to try to save its claim are all part of and inside the alleged scanner that Dr. Min told me was the only one that he relied on, and that's true of paragraph 424 and on

the next slide this is true also of paragraphs 426 and 427.

And so in sum, Your Honor, Finjan cannot prove infringement of the determining and instantiating limitations of the asserted claims for any of the accused products in this case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Denning, do you want to talk about '408?

MR. DENNING: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Do you want to talk about '408?

MR. DENNING: I absolutely do. I'm sorry. I just couldn't hear you.

To set the table to remind us where we are, this is a summary judgment hearing. The issue that we're faced with is whether any reasonable jury could find infringement based on the opinions expressed in Dr. Min's report. So I want to focus on what Dr. Min actually said with regard to these limitations.

PAN argues that the NGFW and WildFire contain a single scanner rather than one for each of the different programming languages. That entire argument is based on those two figures that they showed Dr. Min in his deposition, two very high-level block diagrams of NGFW and WildFire. He says: Yeah, scanner, there's a lot that happens inside of that scanner. There's a lot that happens inside of WildFire. They never addressed that.

Dr. Min did in detail. He looked in detail at the PAN

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     documents, he looked in detail at the PAN source code to see
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     what happens when they get a new file in. What does the
     scanner do at that point? And he unequivocally said it
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 4
     determines the programming language and then instantiates a
 5
     scanner based on that language.
              THE COURT: So go over for me again why you think
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     it's -- when he does one circle, that that's not indicative of
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 8
     him saying it's one scan.
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              MR. DENNING: Sure. So that's the thing that does --
     the thing he circled is the thing that gets the incoming file,
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     it determines the programming language, and then it
11
     instantiates a scanner that then continues on the analysis as
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13
     it goes down.
          That scanner that's -- that is -- I'm blanking on the
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            I've said it a million times this week --
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     instantiated --
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              THE COURT: It is a strange word.
              MR. DENNING: I looked it up. I looked it up on
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19
     Webster's.
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              THE COURT:
                         Right.
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              MR. DENNING: Like, what does this mean?
              THE COURT: Yeah, no, it's straight.
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              MR. DENNING: It's basically create a new instance of
     or something along those lines.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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MR. DENNING: It creates a new instance of a scanner for HTML or a scanner for, you name it, JavaScript, a scanner for Visual Basic. It makes a new scanner based on the language of the file that's coming in.

THE COURT: So it's just your miscommunication; they didn't understand what you were trying to impart?

MR. DENNING: Miscommunication is one way to put it, but I think that's not what Dr. Min meant and it's in complete contravention to what he said in his expert report repeatedly.

I'm shocked to hear representations that Dr. Min never said that NGFW determines the programming language and then instantiates a scanner based on it because he said it dozens of times in his expert report, and I'm willing to talk you through those and show you exactly where it is.

THE COURT: Well, he can't create his own issue by being inconsistent. So --

MR. DENNING: I think it was --

THE COURT: -- in the questions -- I mean, there's not like -- it's not a trick question here. These questions are pretty straightforward. So I'm not sure I follow why you think I should disregard what your counterpart has said about his answers. Because there's no, you know, "I don't understand what you're saying. Could you be more specific?" It's he's answering it and he makes these circles.

MR. DENNING: I think -- I think he's saying: What

does the scanning? This block. It happens in there.

Now, there's a different scanner based on each programming language. That happens within that block. So what's the scanner? Here it is.

But it's in software --

THE COURT: It's somewhere in here and it may be more than one?

MR. DENNING: It's somewhere in here and it's created a new -- every time there's a new file, it has to create a new scanner for every new file. It's not like there's a scanner there and it's the same one that's used over and over and over and over. This is software. This is source code. It creates a new one. For every file that comes in, it instantiates a new scanner. It never uses an old one. It's a new one.

And just as a reminder, the parties agreed -- and this was in Docket 1641, one of the claim construction agreed-upon terms -- that scanner can be, quote, "software, hardware, or a combination of both for scanning."

So software that does the scanning that's instantiated because I know this is HTML, so instantiate an HTML software scanner, that's exactly what happens. Sure, that happens in this big thing that Dr. Min circled and generally said, "That's the scanner," but there's a new one for each of these languages, and I'm happy to talk you through.

I was at the Markman hearing and heard Your Honor loud and

clear about your dislike of demonstratives, so I didn't prepare any for this but I'm happy to talk you through in our --

THE COURT: It -- I hope people -- the bar doesn't say, you know, "Seeborg doesn't like demonstratives." Actually demonstratives are great and they're very useful in trial and other things like that.

And my only comment was, and I don't want it to be taken -- I don't want you to run with it, it's almost an aside that seems like there's no motion in a patent case that doesn't have PowerPoints, but I'm not -- I'm not hostile to them. I'm not trying to, you know, do in them, but I also think you can make your arguments without them.

So, you know, don't worry if you think, "Oh, my God, they got a demonstrative on the other side and he didn't get mad at them, so we should have done a demonstrative." Don't worry about that. It's -- but also, going forward I'm not, you know -- if you want to use a demonstrative, go ahead and use it.

Go ahead.

MR. DENNING: Thank you, Your Honor.

You know who's most happy to hear that? Ms. Brooks, my colleague, who has demonstratives --

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. DENNING: -- and will be showing you those a
little bit later.

But the things that I want to point out to you are in our opposition brief, and so I don't need demonstratives. You can read them yourself.

For instance, all of the things that PAN has ignored where Dr. Min looks under the hood to say, "Well, how does this thing that I called a scanner actually do the scanning," are contained in his expert report with lines like, and this is on page 2 of our opposition [as read]:

"PAN's NGFW includes a scanner (e.g., the content threat detection engine and its components decoder and detecter pattern match) that work in conjunction with the application engine APID" -- which he wrote on one of those slides -- "to analyze a stream."

Okay? It's going to analyze the stream of data.

How does it do that? Well, he points to a function that's called the panav\_\_init\_\_state function. It's a software function. And this is, again, on page 2 of our opposition.

That function instantiates a scanner for the specific programming language corresponding to the file type, and it does so by calling other functions.

And so the panav\_\_init\_\_state function will call the panav\_\_parse\_\_html function to instantiate an HTML scanner, the panav\_\_parse\_\_powershell to instantiate a PowerShell scanner.

Same thing for JS, that's JavaScript; VBS, that's Visual Basic.

Dr. Min said: That's -- first it's determining what the

language is and then it's instantiating an instance -right? -- a new scanner that's going to -- that's going to then
process the rest of that.

THE COURT: And your fundamental point is his answers in the deposition are not inconsistent.

MR. DENNING: Not inconsistent, just --

THE COURT: Because if they are inconsistent, then the fact that he may have set out a very detailed description in his expert report doesn't mean he can't in his deposition go the other way and effectively take himself out.

MR. DENNING: Sure. I think his answers at deposition were at a much higher level of abstract than what he put into his source code analysis, for instance. So when they said, "Where's the scanner," he has no problem, "Sure, here's the scanner," because that's what executes all of these many, many functions below.

And, Your Honor, at pages 2, 3, 4, I won't belabor the point, but it is just chocked full of statements from Dr. Min about how the NGFW scanner does exactly that.

The WildFire scanner does the same thing. It has a function that's called static analysis, and at line 194 of that function it calls a function called static analyzer factory to determine the programming language in which the incoming stream is written. And that's on page 3, lines 9 through 11, of our opposition is the snippet from Dr. Min's expert report where he

talks about these precise functions.

And then a little further down on lines 13 through 16 is more from Dr. Min's report where he says: Okay. After static analyzer factory determines the programming language, it then calls a function -- oh, the function dynamic -- I'm sorry -- static analyzer factory to then instantiate the specific static analyzer.

It does the same thing for dynamic analysis. It has a function called dynamic\_\_analysis\_\_retry, which determines the programming language and then instantiates a specific virtual machine or a scanner and corresponding dynamic analyzer specific to the programming language, Java, Android, PDF. He shows the source code as well for that.

So there's nothing inconsistent with his deposition and his expert report, but to draw conclusions from his high-level deposition testimony that ignore what he says about the low-level functionality in the guts of the source code is inaccurate. They work together, but you can't say, "Oh, he said one scanner so forget everything he said down here about how there are multiple scanners that get instantiated."

PAN doesn't cite any evidence showing that NGFWs and WildFires do not do that. Their argument is based on this line of questioning from Dr. Min's deposition, but they don't say the opposite. All they do is they point to one conclusory opinion from Dr. Rubin that says "NGFW includes a single

scanner," but that's it on the other side in contravention to Dr. Min's page after page of source code analysis.

A reasonable jury could decide to believe Dr. Min. Based on that analysis, summary judgment is inappropriate.

I have more that I can go to --

THE COURT: You do have the burden of infringement.

MR. DENNING: We do have the burden of infringement, and we will bear that burden at trial, but today PAN bears the burden of showing no reasonable jury could find infringement. That's a very different burden, and I submit they have not met it.

One last thing I will point Your Honor to is on page 6 and 7 of our brief, we put a big snippet from Dr. Min's expert report and color-coded it to give a little bit of insight into what part he thinks is doing the determining of the language and what part is doing the instantiating of the scanner. It's well laid out there.

There was talk about rewriting the claim. That's not our position. The claim does not need to be rewritten. The claim is fine the way it is. PAN infringes the way it is. It's a scanner is instantiated based on the programming language that is determined.

I think PAN has inaccurately represented what Finjan said in the Rapid7 case. In the Rapid7 case, Rapid7 wanted to add limitations into the construction; and Finjan said, "There's no

need for that, no need to narrow the claim by adding those limitations. This is already in the claim."

But we're not asking the Court to do that. We're not asking the Court to rewrite the claim so I'm not going to spend much time on that argument. I don't think PAN characterized the comments accurately, but that's not -- we don't think the Court should rewrite the claims to begin with. We think they're just fine the way they are.

With that, I'll stop.

THE COURT: Okay. Very briefly, and then we'll go on to the '633.

MR. MOONEY: Thank you, Your Honor, very briefly.

First, counsel pointed to some evidence -- some excerpts from Dr. Min's report about the WildFire static analyzer. I think it was 426 and 427 of Dr. Min's report. Those do not establish that these elements are met. The claims require determining a language and then instantiating.

And, in fact, what Dr. Min's report makes clear is that the static analyzer itself handles multiple different programming languages and so it can't be the scanner even if that's the new position.

Number two, there's discussion at the beginning about the drawings that Mr. -- Dr. Min was shown, how they were high level, perhaps confusing. The drawings that Dr. Min was shown were drawings that he used in his expert report at, for

1 example, paragraphs 131, 377, 585, 658, and 749. He was 2 familiar with those, and his testimony was 100 percent clear, and it was the testimony that Your Honor saw and not a 3 4 different version of that testimony that we're hearing today. 5 And, lastly, as Your Honor noted, this is Finjan's burden to prove noninfringement, not ours; but Dr. Rubin did, in fact, 6 7 testify, and it's in our papers, that these limitations are not met. 8 9 Thank you, Your Honor. Okay. The '633. 10 THE COURT: MR. SAULSBURY: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 We have a brief set of demonstratives. May I please 12 approach? 13 THE COURT: 14 Thank you. 15 Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 16 MR. SAULSBURY: The argument on the '633 is fairly straightforward here. 17 As you'll recall, at claim construction the dispute was over 18 whether a downloadable-information destination was merely a 19 20 device that can perform the recited functions or whether it had 21 to be a user device. The Court concluded that the term should be construed to be a user device not merely a device. 22

The Court also rejected Finjan's alternative proposal,

which would have allowed the Court to construe it as user

device but include a caveat that a user device can be any

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device. And so that was rejected at *Markman* as well. And so we know that to meet the requirements of asserted Claim 14, Finjan was required to identify a user device.

And the problem with Finjan's infringement case -- if we could please turn to Slide 4 -- is that for neither of the two WildFire products they accuse do they have any expert analysis showing that they have a user device.

The two products at issue are the WF-500 that is a physical server product and the second accused device is the WildFire Public Cloud.

And if we take a look at the evidence that Finjan cites in its opposition in support of its argument that it sufficiently identified a user device, with respect to the WF-500 -- again, this is the physical device -- they point to the testimony of its expert, Dr. Keromytis. And we've highlighted here what Finjan relies on its opposition where Dr. Keromytis says, with respect to the WF-500 appliance [as read]:

"So that is a -- when it is used, that is a downloadable-information destination."

Under Federal Circuit law, this type of parroting of the claim language without any analysis is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment. We've cited a variety of cases in our briefing for this and the point appears to be undisputed.

The other thing Finjan relies on with respect to WF-500 is this testimony later in the same excerpt where Dr. Keromytis

1 says [as read]: 2 "So paragraph 384, that says it's the same functionality; and then in my analysis, I didn't see a 3 distinction so I didn't feel the need to actually say, 4 5 'Well, yeah, it's also the same for WF-500." This is where he's relying on some analysis that he did 6 for the Public Cloud to assert the WF-500 infringes. 7 Ultimately, he said [as read]: 8 "I do include the WF-500 in the list of products that 9 infringe." 10 Again, that sort of conclusory assertion that something 11 12 infringes under circuit law cannot defeat summary judgment. THE COURT: Don't you -- you also offer up Dr. Rubin 13 in this context as providing effectively a contrary position to 14 15 Dr. Keromytis. MR. SAULSBURY: Keromytis. 16 17 THE COURT: Keromytis. Remind me of that. That is true, Your Honor. Dr. Rubin MR. SAULSBURY: 18 comes to an alternative conclusion, and his conclusion is based 19 20 upon evidence explaining why neither the WF-500 nor the 21 WildFire Public Cloud are user devices. He actually addresses this issue whether they're user devices as distinct from just 22 23 devices generically. 24 THE COURT: You say that's what Dr. Keromytis doesn't 25 do?

MR. SAULSBURY: That's exactly right. Dr. Keromytis just asserts that the products meet the limitations of the claim. That's not sufficient.

Under the *Sony* case that we cite in our briefing, the Federal Circuit has said that in order to oppose summary judgment, a patentee's expert actually has to have a fact-based analysis that's tied to logic that explains why the accused instrumentality actually meets the claim as construed. We don't have that here. We just have a bare assertion that the limitation is met.

Turning to Slide 5, this is the paragraph -- this is paragraph 384, the paragraph that Dr. Keromytis referenced in his deposition testimony. As you can see, there's nothing here that explains how the WF-500 is a user device as distinct from any device. He merely says that the WF-500 appliance sandboxes all files locally and analyzes them for malicious behaviors using the same engine used by WildFire Cloud. He's just saying, "My analysis is the same for Public Cloud." He doesn't attempt to explain how it's a user device.

Turning to page -- turning to Slide 6, this is Finjan's opposition evidence in support of its assertion that the WildFire Public Cloud is a user device.

Again, there's no actual expert analysis addressing how the WildFire Public Cloud, which is cloud infrastructure, is a user device as distinct from just a device generically. He

merely asserts the accused products, including WildFire alone, NGFW in combination with WildFire, and Traps in combination with WildFire meet this limitation. That's the highlighted portion of the first excerpt. Conclusory assertion doesn't satisfy their burden opposing summary judgment.

The next excerpt at the bottom, it's of the same nature.

It's a conclusory assertion that the accused products meet the claim term. The Federal Circuit has said that's not enough.

Finally, we get to Slide 7. This is the last of the excerpts from Dr. Keromytis' report that Finjan relies on.

Here, Dr. Keromytis says [as read]:

"WildFire is a downloadable-information destination because it is a device -- a user device or otherwise -- that includes one or more devices or processes that are capable of receiving and initiating or otherwise hosting a mobile code execution."

This suffers from the same problem that we identified earlier. That's the -- there's a couple problems with this, but the first is it's merely a conclusory assertion that the claim limitation is met. He doesn't make any attempt to explain how the WildFire Public Cloud is somehow a user device as distinct from any other sort of device.

Additionally, if we take -- if we take a look at what he's literally saying, he says that it's a device, a user device or otherwise, which means -- which, as a logical matter, means

he's not even taking the position that it's a user device.

It's like saying the accused animal is a mammal, a cat or otherwise; right? It's not -- he's not actually taking the position that it is, in fact, a user device. And so that is a second problem beyond the more foundational problem, that he has no analysis supporting his bare assertion that it's a user device.

I think that's compounded by his Footnote 87, which

Dr. Keromytis acknowledges that he's interpreting the term

"user device" extremely broadly in a manner that's inconsistent with how the Court construed it.

He says [as read]:

"The term 'user device' as used in the '633 patent is quite broad. For example, the patent describes 'user device' as a receiving device or process."

That's essentially the construction that Finjan sought.

They sought a construction under which a user device is a device that can perform a variety of functions, including receiving and processing.

But the Court rejected that construction and additionally included the term "user." Finjan was required to give some significance to the term "user." It hasn't. Dr. Keromytis has essentially read it out of the claims and, therefore, Palo Alto Networks is entitled to summary judgment on the '633 patent.

THE COURT: Mr. Denning.

MR. DENNING: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

I think it's interesting when we look at paragraph 381, which is the one that is up on the screen now, and contrast it, you have to put it in context of Dr. Keromytis' report.

So if we can go to the slide before that, Slide 6, please.

This one shows paragraph 379, two paragraphs before the

one that we were just looking at. And here's what

Dr. Keromytis says there. He says [as read]:

"I understand the parties dispute how the Court should construe the term 'downloadable-information destination.' I further understand Finjan's proposed construction for this term is a device or process that is capable of receiving and initiating or other hosting a mobile code execution."

And then he says [as read]:

"I further understand PAN's proposed construction for this term is a user device that includes one or more devices or processes that are capable of receiving and initiating or otherwise hosting a mobile code execution." And then he said [as read]:

"As I explain, WildFire and NGFW and Traps in combination with WildFire each satisfied both parties' proposed constructions for this term."

Now, ultimately the Court did include user device as was in PAN's proposed construction. Dr. Keromytis said, before the

Court ever ruled on this, because these reports were done several years ago, said, "I think it meets that under the PAN's proposed construction as well."

So when we then go to Slide 7, two paragraphs later, the same page in Dr. Keromytis' report, and he says [as read]:

"WildFire is a downloadable-information destination because it is a device -- a user device or otherwise -- that includes one or more devices of processes and carries on."

Clearly when he says "a user device or otherwise," he's meaning under PAN's proposed construction or under Finjan's proposed construction. It's right after he just said, "Under both of those proposals, I think it meets the limitation."

So he is not here making some sort of logical insufficiency. He's just saying, "Under this one or under that one, I think it meets the limitation."

He -- it is not insignificant that Dr. Keromytis then drops the footnote and talks about the use of the term "user device" within the '633 patent; and, indeed, the '633 patent uses the term "user device" very broadly. It talks about it as a receiving device or process. It says that a user device -- user device may operate as a firewall/server. So something that's a firewall and a server can be a user device in the '633 patent. It describes that in the specification. Dr. Keromytis is recognizing that as he is applying that term to WildFire.

Dr. Keromytis was also asked in deposition, and this is in Exhibit E, page 284, line 16, to 285, line 11, whether WildFire servers are a, quote, "client device," and he said they are.

Counsel for PAN never asked him if he thought that they were a user device, but he testified they are a client device.

In contrast, Dr. Rubin's opinions that WildFire is not a user device are based on very narrow meaning of "user device" that was rejected by the Court and adds additional limitations.

PAN points to Dr. Rubin's opinion that WildFire virtual machines are implemented as a cloud-base solution and are not devices which provide direct user interaction, let alone being client endpoint devices. There's nothing in the Court's construction about providing direct user interaction or being a client endpoint device. Dr. Rubin's opinions are beside the point here.

Similarly, for WildFire 500, Dr. Rubin said [as read]:

"WildFire appliance is a private cloud appliance which is a dedicated device separate from a user device/client device while user device can be separate from another user device."

Dr. Rubin's opinion is not relevant to the point at hand.

Dr. Keromytis' opinion stands in contrast. And that's really the issue; that the jury should listen from both of these gentleman and make a decision about what a -- whether this is a user device or not.

This was a discussion we had during the *Markman* hearing a few months ago when this -- when this term was being discussed and counsel for PAN said, when we expressed some concern that a jury might think "user device" and think their iPhone or their laptop, and we said [as read]:

"The specification has a much broader use of the term 'user device' and we're worried that a lay juror is going to be confused by the term 'user device.'"

Counsel for PAN said [as read]:

"Your Honor, that's an issue that the experts will address."

Counsel said on the jury confusion point [as read]:

"We don't believe there will be any confusion over user device. We don't believe the jurors are going to believe that iPhones are the only user devices but, of course, there will be technical experts that are going to testify to assist the jury in that regard."

That's what counsel for PAN argued to this Court trying to persuade this Court to include user device in the construction. This Court did so. And now when Finjan's expert is prepared to testify that WildFire is a user device, as that term is used in the '633 patent, PAN is trying to preclude the jury from ever hearing that opinion.

Finally, it's worth spending one minute reminding how we got to that construction at the *Markman* hearing. There was

a -- Judge Freeman construed the same term in the *Cisco* case, and Your Honor found that you would adopt the same construction that Judge Freeman adopted, and that included user device.

But it's worth noting that in Judge Freeman's order that construed that claim, she recognized -- the Court recognized that "user device" is not a narrowly defined term.

Judge Freeman said [as read]:

"Cisco contends that the information destination of the downloadable information must be the final destination of a downloadable on the grounds that the specification describes that an unexecutable downloadable is sent to the client that originally requested the downloadable. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive."

And then the Court went on to say [as read]:

"More importantly, the specification explicitly
equates information with user device and describes that a
user device can include one or more devices or processes,
such as e-mail, browser, or other clients that are capable
of receiving and initiating or otherwise hosting a mobile
code execution. In addition, the specification discloses
that a user device can operate as a firewall and server."
So when this Court adopted the Cisco construction, that
just gives some context to how the Cisco court came to that
construction "user device" doesn't mean just your phone.

Dr. Keromytis has opined with support that WildFire is a

downloadable device.

Now, maybe there's some interesting cross-examination that counsel for PAN will have for Dr. Keromytis at trial, but he's laid out the basis for his opinion, and that is enough to defeat summary judgment at this stage.

THE COURT: Very briefly.

MR. SAULSBURY: Yes, Your Honor.

So I'll note that we still have not heard anything about what makes the accused WildFire devices user devices as distinct from devices generally.

We were pointed by counsel to Slide 6 where Dr. Keromytis says he thinks there's infringement under either party's construction. That's a bare assertion. It's precisely the type of bare assertion the Federal Circuit rejected in the Intellectual Science case, DynaCore Holdings case, and Schwing cases that we cited in our briefing.

We've -- we heard from counsel that the specification acknowledges that a user device can be configured to be a firewall or a server. Our position isn't inconsistent with that at all; but in order for there to be infringement, their expert still needed to show that whatever firewall or server they were contending was a user device, was a user device in the first place that was then configured to be a firewall or server, much like one could argue that when I turn my iPhone into hotspot mode, it has been configured to be a gateway but

there's no analysis of that whatsoever. There's no analysis of how it's a user device to begin with.

And counsel also suggested this is an issue for the jury. Their expert should be permitted to explain to the jury how the accused WildFire devices are user devices. But, again, he has nothing to explain to them because he has done nothing to analyze what makes these devices a user device.

And so for that reason, we're entitled to summary judgment on the '633 patent.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's go on to '731.

MR. SAULSBURY: Certainly, Your Honor.

MR. DENNING: Your Honor, on this point, I spoke with counsel for PAN before the hearing. We had a couple different infringement theories that we were pursuing in this case. One of them involved something called the AV Signature; and to streamline the case and to streamline the presentation at trial, we do not intend to pursue that particular infringement theory.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DENNING: And so I don't think we need to address it today.

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. SAULSBURY: Thank you, Your Honor.

And if I may approach, I have handouts for the '731.

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. SAULSBURY: They do contain slides on the AV Signature issue.

THE COURT: So you're going to skip over those?

MR. SAULSBURY: Exactly right, Your Honor. We understand that they're out of the case.

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. SAULSBURY: So for the '731 patent, as Your Honor knows from the Markman hearing, there are two main limitations that really matter here. The claims -- all asserted claims require a security profile, which the asserted claims explicitly say comprises a list of computer commands or some other claims say comprises a list of one or more computer commands. But the point is, there has to be a security profile; it has to have at least one computer command.

The other requirement found in all asserted claims is that there has to be a security profile cache for storing the security profiles that we just talked about.

So the net of those two requirements is that Finjan in order to show infringement had to show the presence of a security profile containing at least one computer command that was present in a security profile cache.

Now, we also know from the claim construction hearing that a cache is temporary storage. In Finjan's opposition, it noted that "security profile cache" was not the precise term that the Court construed. We note that it is a term that was proposed

for construction. Regardless, I don't think there's a dispute. Finjan doesn't actually argue that the cache in security profile cache should encompass permanent storage. I think it's understood that a security profile cache is temporary storage just like the cache that Your Honor construed at Markman.

And so turning to page -- it's at Slide 4, as we can see, there's -- just to reiterate, there's two different requirements. There has to be the security profile with one or more computer commands and that security profile has to be in temporary storage.

Now, when we got here, there were a couple of different theories. I think we're down to essentially two plus doctrine of equivalents, and so we'll address them in turn.

The first is WildFire reports. And Finjan's expert took the position that WildFire reports are the security profile. The problem with the WildFire reports theory is that there is no evidence that WildFire reports, even if they can be considered as having computer commands, are present in temporary storage.

And so in Finjan's opposition brief, what it points to is the temporary storage is Local DB. This is one of the databases that both experts analyzed. The problem with Local DB as it relates to the WildFire reports is that there was no evidence that the WildFire reports are ever stored in Local DB. And so it's an issue where we don't have -- where

one of the two limitations is missing. In this case, it's the requirement that the WildFire reports be stored in temporary storage.

That takes us, then, to a couple slides on the AV Signatures, which are no longer in the case, and so we will skip on past those.

And that takes us to Slide 8. And so Slide 8 addresses a couple of newer theories that we found in Finjan's opposition where it asserts that various scan results and analysis results are the security profile that are stored in a security profile cache and, therefore, supposedly meet the claims.

The problem with this theory is that there is no evidence that the scan results and analysis results that they rely on in their opposition meet the express requirement of the security profile as containing one or more computer commands.

Very much like the issue we saw with the '633 patent that we just went over, the only thing that they can point to is conclusory assertions by their experts saying that the claim limitation is met. We know from the Federal Circuit that that is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

And so on Slide 8 we see an excerpt that Finjan relies on from Dr. Jakobsson's report. He asserts that the analyzer, PAN's analyzer, finishes sample processing and outputs result data into Local DB. And he asserts that this, quote, "maps to the functionality required by the security profile cache since

it stores the scan results (i.e., the security profiles derived by the scanner including a list of computer commands...) "

That's just parroting the claim language. He has no analysis identifying what the supposed computer commands are that are present in the results data. There's no identification of that whatsoever.

And so this is just like the *Intellectual Science* case in which the Federal Circuit found that the expert opinions there fail to set forth facts in a line of reasoning with a logical foundation sufficient to show infringement.

There are a host of other results -- scan results, analysis results, et cetera -- covered in Finjan's opposition. The same problem applies with respect to each of them.

If you take a look at the only evidence they have for the proposition that they contain computer instructions, it's the bare assertion of their expert. There's zero identification of any actual computer instructions.

Finally, that takes us to DOE. I think this is pretty straightforward because Dr. Jakobsson's DOE theory doesn't address the absence of computer instructions. We've produced his DOE theory on Slides 9 and 10 of the slide presentation. And so we can see from these four paragraphs what he's trying to address is he's essentially saying: Even if it's understood that the locations in which the security profiles are stored is not temporary, it's still temporary under the doctrine of

equivalents. I, therefore, find that there's still a security profile cache under the doctrine of equivalents.

But the foundational problem with this theory is that it doesn't address the separate requirement that there has to be a security profile containing one or computer instructions.

Therefore, it cannot -- the DOE theory cannot cure the foundational problem with the analysis results and scan results that Finjan relies on because there is still no computer instructions.

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. DENNING: I'll start right there at the end.

So counsel showed a slide that had WildFire reports and then scan results or analysis results as a separate column. Those are the same thing, and Dr. Jakobsson treats them as the same thing throughout his report. The scan results, analysis results, analysis reports, WildFire reports, that's what comes out of WildFire after it has analyzed the suspicious code. It's all the same thing.

So is there any chance that I could use the ELMO?

THE CLERK: Sure. Oh, the ELMO? Okay. Yeah

MR. DENNING: Thank you so much.

So I'm going to start near the end of counsel's presentation where he said there's absolutely no evidence from Dr. Jakobsson that those scan results contain a list of the tasks or program that the suspicious code was seeking to

1 execute. 2 THE CLERK: It's on. For some reason it's not working now. Hold on one second. 3 4 (Pause in proceedings.) 5 MR. DENNING: So I'm showing, Your Honor, this is Exhibit --6 It's still not working. 7 THE CLERK: MR. DENNING: Oh, it's not showing on yours? 8 9 THE CLERK: It's not showing anywhere. THE COURT: You'll have to go to Plan B. 10 MR. DENNING: Plan B, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Yes, Plan B. 12 MR. DENNING: I will -- I will show you based on the 13 exhibits to the briefing. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. MR. DENNING: So I'm looking at Exhibit 14 to PAN's 16 17 opening brief, opening summary judgment brief, and those are excerpts from Dr. Jakobsson's expert report, and I will direct 18 19 your attention to paragraph 658 to start with. I'm going to show you a few of these just because I really think I need to 20 21 disprove the point that counsel for PAN just made. 22 At paragraph 658 Dr. Jakobsson said [as read]: 23 "As part of the malware sandboxing process, WildFire scans for behaviors and provides a listing of behaviors 24 25 (i.e., behavior summary) which correspond to a list of

computer commands that a corresponding one of the incoming files is programmed to perform."

It's exactly that, the list of computer commands that this incoming file is programmed to perform.

And then Dr. Jakobsson pastes in an example from a PAN document. It says "Example" on top. So this is at the top of page 228 of his expert report. There's an example that's called "Behavioral Summary," and it lists all of the things that that suspicious code was trying to do: Use the HTPP post method, attempted to sleep for a long period, connected to an IP address over HTTP. That's a listing of the things that this suspicious code was attempting to execute.

And Dr. Jakobsson said, "Those are computer commands that correspond to the incoming file." That's the scan analysis report.

In paragraph 664 of his report, which is just a few pages later, Dr. Jakobsson talks about testing and says [as read]:

"Testing of WildFire and the NGFW show -- in addition to PAN documentation, explains that reports are generated for WildFire and NGFW based on the incoming file that is analyzed and that the report will show detailed behavioral information, including a behavioral summary (deriving a security profile, including a list of computer commands that a corresponding one of the incoming files is programmed to perform)."

And then he attaches snippets from documents from PAN that say things like [as read]:

"The WildFire reports will show detailed behavioral information for the sample."

And then it shows actual, on pages 6- -- 234, 235 shows actual sample reports. This is the scan results, the analysis results. And on page 237 we see a heading called "Behavioral Summary," and it lists all the things that this suspicious code was trying to do [as read]:

"Each virtual machine tab summarizes the behavior of the sample file in the specific environment. Examples include whether the sample created or modified files, started a process, spawns new processes, modified the registry, or installed browser helper objects."

This is exactly what counsel for PAN just said isn't in Dr. Jakobsson's report at all, and it is in here over and over again. Paragraph 667 shows additional reports from his own testing. Dr. Jakobsson tested this product on his own in addition to looking at the source code, and at page 241 he shows the behavioral summary portion of the results that came back from his own testing of this product.

So there is no question and there can be no question that these scan reports do include the type of behavior that this suspicious code was trying to execute. Certainly at the very least for purposes of today, a reasonable jury could find that

based on Dr. Jakobsson's expert report, that it is included in there.

Okay. So that's the first part. This is the security profile that includes a list of computer commands that the corresponding file was to perform.

The second question then presented by counsel for PAN is: Yeah, but is that stored in temporary storage? And, yes, it absolutely is.

Dr. Jakobsson opines that, quote [as read]:

"Security profiles (e.g., scan results or analysis reports following a scan) are stored in a security profile cache (e.g., in a local database such as Local DB, Central DB, Virus Database, or in disk storage after a scan ends)."

There's also -- there are multiple cites here. I'm looking at paragraph -- this is page 19 of our opposition, lines 13 through 19, showed PAN documentation that say exactly that; that the Wild -- this is, quote, "The WildFire analyzer stores analysis results and intermediate data derived security profile in Local DB," which he says is a security profile cache.

All right. So we know that these scan results have the program information. They're stored in Local DB. The next thing we need to know is: What is Local DB and is it temporary storage? And we know for sure that it is.

If we look on page 19 of our opposition, there is a snippet from a PAN document. This isn't something

Dr. Jakobsson is opining on. This is a PAN document that says

[as read]:

"Local DB in each PU for analyzer to temporarily save the analysis results and intermit data."

PAN's own document -- this is -- it's Exhibit H to the opposition at 337. PAN's own document says that its Local DB is temporary storage.

Based on all of that, there can be no dispute that it meets the limitation, let alone that a reasonable jury could find that it meets this limitation.

I think I'm done, Your Honor. Let me check -- oh, no.

I want to say one thing about the doctrine of equivalents point. I don't think we need to get there because I think we have this under literal infringement, but Dr. Jakobsson's opinions go on for hundreds of pages and hundreds of paragraphs before this.

So when he says in the doctrine of equivalent section,
"Based on the things I talked about before, it would also meet
the same function, way, and result," he's not doing that in a
vacuum. It's bassed on hundreds of pages and hundreds of
paragraphs of his analysis.

And his statements in each of these paragraphs is not simply function, way, result. He gives an explanation. For

example, for the function test, he says [as read]:

"The security policy cache for each of the accused products at least temporarily store the index security policy derived from the scanner's static and dynamic behavioral analysis of the file."

He said similar things for the way and for the results.

This wasn't just a bare doctrine of equivalents analysis.

And with that, I'll conclude on the '731, Your Honor.

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. SAULSBURY: So just briefly a few points, Your Honor.

On the doctrine of equivalents, I don't think we need to go there because we heard nothing about how it addresses the problem with security profiles. We only heard about how it addresses temporary storage.

And then going to where counsel started, there was an assertion that WildFire reports are the same as the scan results and the analysis results. That's not Dr. Jakobsson's opinion. If we take a look at his report, throughout when he's talking about WildFire reports, he uses capital W, WildFire, capital R, Report. That's a specific thing he identifies.

And when he's talking about WildFire reports, he attempts to map it to something that is stored in temporary storage, but he fails to. And as we explained earlier, that's why WildFire reports can't be sufficient because even if -- even if they

could be understood to include computer commands, they're not stored in temporary storage.

That, then, takes us to all the scan results and analysis results that we heard counsel address. And the problem with those, again, is that there's not actually any opinion other than a conclusory assertion they contain computer instructions. There's no identification of computer instructions.

We heard a bunch of references to portions of

Dr. Jakobsson's report. I'll just take one as an example. We

were pointed to paragraph 658, and we were told that he

identifies computer commands right there. What he actually

says is [as read]:

"As part of the malware sandboxing process, WildFire scans for behaviors and provides a reporting" -- "report listing the behaviors which correspond to a list of computer commands."

He says "correspond to." He doesn't actually say there are computer commands there nor does he identify what the purported security profile is much less identify temporary storage, a cache, that it's located in.

And so what we have here is they were required under the claims to identify a specific security profile that was stored in a specific cache that is temporary storage. Instead, they point to all sorts of different random references to different scan results that they assert contain computer commands, but

1 there's not actually evidence of that. 2 And, moreover, there's not any tying of a specific scan result that contains computer instructions to temporary 3 4 storage. 5 And for that reason, we're entitled to summary judgment, Your Honor. 6 I know you're busting at the seams to say 7 THE COURT: something, so I'll let you say something. 8 MR. DENNING: Just if you turn the page, right after 9 that paragraph he read on 658 is the example that lists the 10 commands that I just discussed with you. So it's not just a 11 bare assertion. He's pointing to the example that he includes 12 13 there. MR. SAULSBURY: He says "correspond to a list of 14 15 computer commands." THE COURT: I qotcha. 16 I know I have other motions that are pending, but 17 today's hearing were focused on the motion for summary judgment 18 So I will take that under submission and work on it. by PAN. 19 20 MR. SAULSBURY: Thank you very much, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. 21 MR. DENNING: And may I say one thing to the Court? 22 23 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DENNING: You had asked in the order that you submitted after filing the opening briefs with regard to

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     Finjan's motion for summary judgment of no invalidity --
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              THE COURT: Yes.
              MR. DENNING: -- you had asked the parties to indicate
 3
 4
     in our briefs whether it's necessary to reach those --
              THE COURT: Yes.
 5
              MR. DENNING: -- should you grant.
 6
          We neglected to do that in our reply brief. I apologize
 7
     to the Court. I can tell you now that if you find no
 8
     infringement of any of the -- of all three patents, then you
 9
     would not have to reach that.
10
11
              THE COURT: Fine.
          Which is also your position.
12
              MR. SAULSBURY: That's right, Your Honor.
13
              THE COURT: Yeah.
14
15
              MR. SAULSBURY:
                             Thank you.
              THE COURT: Okay.
                                 Thank you.
16
17
                   (Proceedings adjourned at 3:19 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Thursday, November 21, 2024 DATE: Kelly Shainline, CSR No. 13476, RPR, CRR U.S. Court Reporter